Mutembo Nchito v Attorney General 2016/CC/0029 (27 October 2020) by Kaaba, O\u27Brien & Sambo, Pamela Towela
SAIPAR Case Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 2 November 2020 Article 4 
11-2020 
Mutembo Nchito v Attorney General 2016/CC/0029 (27 October 
2020) 
O'Brien Kaaba 
University of Zambia; Southern African Institute for Policy and Research, okaaba@yahoo.com 
Pamela Towela Sambo 
University of Zambia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr 
 Part of the African Studies Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Courts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kaaba, O'Brien and Sambo, Pamela Towela (2020) "Mutembo Nchito v Attorney General 2016/CC/0029 
(27 October 2020)," SAIPAR Case Review: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr/vol3/iss2/4 
This Case Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in SAIPAR Case Review by an authorized editor of 
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu. 





 Mutembo Nchito v Attorney General 2016/CC/0029 (27 October 2020)1 
O’Brien Kaaba2 and Pamela Towela Sambo3 
 
Facts 
The facts giving rise to the Mutembo Nchito case are well known as they largely played out in 
the public arena. The petitioner, Mutembo Nchito, was appointed as Director of Public 
Prosecution (DPP) in 2011 by President Sata (who later died in office in October 2014 and was 
succeeded by Edgar Lungu). In March 2015, President Edgar Lungu suspended Nchito from 
office and established a Tribunal to investigate his suitability for remaining in office. The terms 
of reference for the Tribunal revolved around two categories of allegations. The first category 
impugned his irregular entry of nolle prosequi allegedly in abuse of his power, including in a 
criminal case against him. The second category related to taking over and subsequently 
discontinuing prosecution of criminal cases in matters he allegedly had personal interest. The 
Tribunal had three members: retired Chief Justices Annel Silungwe (as chairperson), Mathew 
Ngulube, and Ernest Sakala. Following the Tribunal’s conclusion of its work, the President in 
August 2016 wrote Nchito a letter to the effect that he had relieved him of his duties, on the 
recommendation of the Tribunal, pursuant to Article 144 of the Constitution. The Tribunal’s 
findings and report were never made public and Nchito himself was not availed the report. On 
that basis alone, it is impossible to know whether or not the President exercised his powers to 
remove the DPP on proper motives. Nchito challenged his removal but the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the President acted constitutionally in removing him. 
 
Holding 
The Constitutional Court held that the President acted constitutionally in removing Mutembo 
Nchito as DPP. 
 
Significance 
Constitutional Courts were designed to superintend constitutional order through adjudicating 
constitutional disputes in a manner that fosters the deepening of democracy and vindicates 
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constitutional norms. Historically, constitutional courts have been associated with the 
entrenchment of the rule of law and liberal democracy, following their emergence and 
development around the world, from the time they appeared in Europe in the early 20th century, 
and are now dotted all over Asia, Latin America and Africa.  These specialised courts have 
been hailed as enforcers of democratic norms and mediators of democratic allocation of 
constitutional power in a manner that thwarts excessive accumulation of power in one 
individual or entity, thereby maintaining a reasonable balance between and among the key 
branches of government.  
 
Constitutional courts have been seen as symbols of constitutionalism and the rule of law.  It is 
undoubtedly for this reason that the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016 
enacted the establishment of the Constitutional Court (Concourt). Upon reading the various 
Constitutional Commission Review reports that recommended the establishment of the 
Constitutional Court, one gets a clear perspective that Zambians wanted a departure from 
judicial escapism, inefficiency, a formalistic, narrow, and superficial adjudication of 
constitutional matters. Zambians have, in essence, been looking for a court that would bring 
positive change to constitutional adjudication by being a midwife of contextually relevant 
jurisprudence through interpreting the Constitution in a manner that advances constitutionalism 
and democracy.  The problem is that the Zambian Constitutional Court, judged by the depth of 
its jurisprudence, does not seem to fit into the legacy of other progressive constitutional courts 
such as the South African Constitutional Court. The latest demonstration of this is to be found 
in the recent decision of the Court relating to the removal of Mutembo Nchito as Director of 
Public Prosecution (DPP). 
 
The Constitutional Court on 27 October, 2020 rendered its judgment in the case of Mutembo 
Nchito v Attorney General 2016/CC/0029 (27 October 2020).  Taking the Mutembo Nchito 
judgment as a microcosm of the Constitutional Court judgments, the decisions of the Court 
tend to be thinly reasoned, under-researched, lacking in critical reflection, deficient in rigorous 
legal analysis, demonstrating a mechanical and unreflective reliance on precedents, and above 
all, contextually irrelevant. The Court is simply sanctifying the jurisprudence of executive 
righteousness, akin to what former Kenyan Attorney General, Amos Wako, stated in 1991 that 




“a characteristic of the rule of law is that no man, save for the president, is above the law.”4 
The globally respected Ghanaian constitutional law scholar, Professor Kwesi Prempeh aptly 
described this problem in the following words: “[t]he result, in the African context, is what I 
have called a ‘jurisprudence of executive supremacy’- a jurisprudence that is unduly deferential 
to executive power, and, at best skeptical of ‘novel’ claims rooted in modern conceptions of 
constitutionalism.”5 
 
Before addressing substantive defects of the judgment, we would like to say a few words about 
the Constitutional Court’s seeming inefficiency. It took four years for the Court to dispose of 
this straightforward case. The court largely blames the delay on the parties for being “locked 
in interlocutories.” The Court does not explain how and why resolving interlocutory matters 
took so long. A perusal of the record shows that the case was concluded in September 2019. It 
therefore took the Court more than a year to render a mere 50-page judgment. The Court offered 
no apology or explanation for its own delay, which is manifestly a violation of Article 118(2)(b) 
of the Constitution which requires that “justice shall not be delayed.”  Obviously, this delay 
cannot be justified on the basis of the depth of research conducted, as the judgment, apart from 
routine references to case law and statutes, only made reference to two other publications: 
Black’s Law Dictionary and Garth Thornton’s Legislative Drafting book. Considering the 
importance of the case to the constitutional life of the state, the display of inadequate research 
in this judgment is by any standard shocking. It also bears noting that the Constitutional Court 
is a new court which has no case backlogs and has a very low caseload (as compared, for 
example, with the Supreme Court which had in excess of 4,000 case backlogs prior to the 
establishment of the Court of Appeal). 
 
Courts are creatures of the Constitution and accountable under the Constitution. Article 118 (1) 
of the Constitution provides that judicial authority derives from the people and should be 
exercised in a manner that promotes accountability. Delivering a judgment more than a year 
after the case closed, without any explanation or apology, is inconsistent with the spirit of 
accountability dictated by the Constitution. In the case of the Constitutional Court, this is not 
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an isolated case, this having been reflected in a number of cases such as the appeals relating to 
the Lusaka Central and Munali constituency election disputes. 
 
An accountable court is sensitive to the inconvenience it may cause to the litigants and keeps 
those concerned well updated. The inconvenience is also apparent in relation to the 
development of constitutional precedence, not to mention the ever-learning general citizenry 
that looks forward to speedy resolution of contentious constitutional matters. A relatively 
recent UK High Court judgment involving Zambian litigants (see the case of Dominic 
Liswaniso Lungowe & Others v Vedanta Resources Plc and Konkola Copper Mines [2016] 
EWHC 975 (TCC)) is instructive in how other judges take matters of efficiency seriously. The 
Judge delayed issuing the decision by only a few weeks, but apologized profusely and offered 
the following convincing explanation for the delay:  
 
The applications were heard over three days in mid-April 2016. The first full draft of this Judgment was 
prepared in the four days immediately thereafter, after which I went on circuit until the end of May. As 
I explained to the parties at the outset of the hearing, the logistical difficulty that I faced was that I could 
not take the 24 lever arch files on circuit, which meant in consequence that the final 'polishing' stage in 
the production of this Judgment was delayed for longer than I would have wished. 
 
Unlike the UK High Court which only delayed handing down its decision by a few weeks but 
apologized and offered a cogent explanation, the Constitutional Court in the Mutembo Nchito 
case offered no apology or explanation for handing down a judgment more than a year after 
the case closed. 
 
Now to the substance of the judgment. A reading of the Mutembo Nchito judgment makes one 
wonder where the Court is taking the country in terms of constitutional jurisprudence. It should 
be recalled at this stage that the terms of reference for the Tribunal empanelled to probe Nchito 
relate to his granting of the nolle prosequi and the taking over and discontinuance of trials he 
is alleged to have had personal interest in.  The Constitutional Court had a golden opportunity 
to develop progressive jurisprudence that would ensure the DPP would be accountable for the 
exercise of their constitutional powers when it considered the case of Milford Maambo and 
Others v The People 2016/CC/R001 [2017], but squandered it. It instead held that the DPP 
enjoyed absolute or unfettered discretion in the exercise of their powers, and was not even 
answerable to the courts. Although we do not agree with this decision (because in a 




constitutional democracy power is given for purposes consistent with underlying constitutional 
values), it represents the current position of the ‘law’ until a future court reverses it. This being 
the ‘law’, it follows that how the DPP exercises power under the Constitution is unassailable. 
Taking the Milford Maambo decision to its logical conclusion would actually mean that it was 
unconstitutional to set up a Tribunal to probe into how the DPP exercised unfettered discretion.  
Ironically, whatever the findings of the Tribunal, the authority of Milford Maambo (a very bad 
precedent) suggests that Nchito was removed from office for doing no recognizable wrong 
under the Constitution. Perhaps that is why the Nchito judgment does not point at any wrong 
he committed. In granting nolle prosequi and discontinuing criminal matters, Nchito as then 
DPP was simply exercising his unfettered discretion, as propounded by the very Constitutional 
Court! How ironic. 
 
In arriving at the conclusion that the President acted constitutionally in removing Nchito, the 
Court refused to consider the process leading to his removal. The Court actually went out of its 
way to preclude him from producing witnesses before it on the pretext that the matters he raised 
were purely legal in nature. By concluding that the President acted constitutionally in removing 
Nchito, the Court simply relied on its interpretation of Article 58 of the Constitution (now 
repealed). There are many things wrong with how the Court dealt with the process leading to 
the removal of the DPP. Due to limited space, only three shall be highlighted here.  
 
First, the Tribunal’s findings were never made public. But more significantly, the petitioner 
was not furnished with a copy of the Tribunal’s report. The petitioner had actually applied to 
the Court to order that he be furnished with the report. A single judge of the Court in a ruling 
of 19 October, 2016 declined to grant the application on the pretext that ordering the release of 
the report would require the interpretation of the Constitution, which power, according to his 
reading of Article 129(1) and (2) of the Constitution, a single judge did not have. This is mere 
casuistic sophistry. It is logically impossible to reach the conclusion the judge reached without 
actually interpreting the Constitution. In arriving at the conclusion that he could not grant the 
order as a single judge, the judge was actually interpreting the text of the Constitution. His 
decision was based on the interpretation of provisions he believed divested him of jurisdiction 
to interpret the Constitution. He did not just close his eyes and pick lots. He simply preferred 
an interpretation that did not advance the interests of the petitioner and justice. There is actually 
no provision in the Constitution that divests a single judge from interpreting the Constitution 
in order to resolve an interlocutory matter. In any case, considering that the Constitution is the 




supreme law that gives life to all other laws, it is impossible to conceive of an interlocutory 
ruling a judge can give in a constitutional matter that does not directly or indirectly involve 
interpretation of the Constitution. All the interlocutory rulings made by single judges of the 
Court so far actually demonstrate that they were interpreting the Constitution. Otherwise what 
else could have been the source of their authority to make those rulings? 
The full bench of the Constitutional Court later considered the issue of the petitioner not being 
furnished with the Tribunal report. Surprisingly it placed the blame on the petitioner in not 
renewing the application for discovery of the report before the full bench of the Court. Although 
the Court ordered that the petitioner was entitled to the report, it made no consequential orders 
arising from that finding. Put simply, this Court’s finding did not alter the fate of the petitioner. 
If the petitioner was entitled to a copy of the report but did not get one, that is a violation of his 
rights, for which the Court should have provided redress. Strangely, the Constitutional Court 
did not link this to the violations of any constitutional norms, not even any of the basic national 
values and principles enshrined in Article 8 and decreed to “apply to the interpretation of the 
Constitution and enactment and interpretation of the law” by Article 9 of the Constitution.  
Comparative jurisprudence shows that failure to furnish a concerned person with reasons for 
an adverse decision affecting them should be fatal to the process. For example, a three-member 
panel of the Kenyan High Court in the case of Joseph Mbalu Mutava v Attorney General & 
another [2014] eKLR considered a similar situation where the Judicial Service Commission 
commenced the process of the removal of a judge and escalated the process to the president to 
suspend the judge without giving the concerned judge a report of their findings. The Court not 
only considered that this was a violation of the judge’s right to fair administrative action (a 
constitutionally protected right under the Kenyan Constitution), but also that this was a 
violation of fundamental constitutional values. It stated:  
 
In addition to implementing the provisions of the Constitution, the Commission is guided by the values 
of Article 10 which include the value of good governance, transparency and accountability. Giving 
reasons for actions undertaken by a constitutional body is in our view a key hallmark of good governance, 
transparency and accountability. In this case, it is our finding and we hold that the Commission had a 
duty to furnish the Petitioner with the reasons for its decision that it abdicated this constitutional duty.6 
 
The Court considered this fatal to the process and ordered another more transparent process to 
start. The Zambian Constitution contains similar constitutional values to those of the Kenyan 
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Constitution. These are enshrined under Article 8 and include democracy, constitutionalism, 
good governance and integrity. Article 9 demands that these values and principles are binding 
and should be considered when interpreting the Constitution and other laws. 
 
Yet for unclear reasons, the Constitutional Court generally tends to make decisions at variance 
with these constitutional values and principles. Constitutional values are not mere lofty 
aspirations or decorations. The express inclusion of fundamental values in national 
constitutions was pioneered by Germany in the aftermath of World War II and this has become 
a common standard in recent constitutions. Fundamental values are purposed to ensure that a 
constitution should never be viewed as a neutral document that merely regulates state power, 
but as a document that aims to impose a normative value system on the country. The 
implication of this development is that whenever the constitution is interpreted, the courts 
should choose an interpretation that accords, promotes and effects those values embodied in 
the constitution. It is, therefore, mandatory for judges to justify their decisions in relation to the 
enshrined constitutional values and principles. It is the only way the constitution can retain its 
transformative character and avoid being a dead letter. The late former Chief Justice of South 
Africa, Pius Langa, emphasized the importance of this transformative approach, which puts 
constitutional values at the centre of constitutional adjudication in the following words:  
 
The Constitution demands that all decisions be capable of being substantively defended in terms of the 
rights and values that it enshrines. It is no longer sufficient for judges to rely on the say-so of parliament 
or technical readings of legislation as providing justifications for their decisions. Under a transformative 
Constitution, judges bear the ultimate responsibility to justify their decisions not only by reference to 
authority, but by reference to ideas and values.7 
 
It is, therefore, anomalous that while the Zambian Constitution now expressly enshrines 
underlining constitutional values and principles, these were never articulated and honoured in 
this case. There remains no consequence for their violation as it is. 
 
The second issue the Court ducked in relation to the procedure leading to the removal of the 
DPP relates to the alleged bias of two of the three Tribunal members. These are Justices 
Mathew Ngulube and Ernest Sakala. The petitioner considered that he would not get fair 
treatment from the two because he had previous negative encounters with both. In relation to 
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Justice Ngulube, the petitioner indicated that he played a role in exposing the ring of corruption 
and abuse of public resources during the Chiluba Presidency (1991-2001), which led to the 
resignation of Justice Ngulube, following an exposure to the effect that he (Justice Ngulube) 
was a beneficiary of secret payments from an account operated by security agencies. (The 
British High Court in the case of Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care and Desai and other 
[2007] EWHC 952) did actually confirm these allegations). In relation to Justice Sakala, the 
petitioner indicated that he had made a personal complaint against him to the Minister of Justice 
about his improper involvement in a case involving Nchito’s business interests. That being the 
case, the Constitutional Court was duty bound to establish that the alleged bias did not affect 
the integrity and findings of the Tribunal. Procedural fairness is a sacred standard in a 
constitutional democracy. The importance of this was articulated by the South African 
Constitutional Court in the case of Janse van Rensburg  NO v Minister of Trade and Industry 
NO 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC) when it held:  
 
Observance of the rules of procedural fairness ensures that an administrative functionary has an open 
mind and a complete picture of the facts and circumstances within which the administrative action is to 
be taken. In that way the functionary is more likely to apply his or her mind to the matter in a fair and 
regular manner.8  
 
More specifically in relation to bias, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in S v Roberts 
1999 (4) SA 915 (SCA) established a four stage test of bias, as follows:  
 
1) There must be a suspicion that the judicial officer might (not would) be biased;  
2) The suspicion must be that of a reasonable person in the position of the accused or the litigant;  
3) The suspicion must be based on reasonable grounds; and   
4) The suspicion is something that the reasonable person would (not might) have.  
 
Assuming the facts were as the petitioner alleged, then the Tribunal members complained 
against would manifestly not meet the requisite standard of impartiality. 
 
If the allegations of bias were taken into account and established, it would be clear that the DPP 
was not subjected to a fair removal process. The Constitutional Court, however, avoided 
dealing with this issue. In a ruling of 18 April 2019, the Constitutional Court held that the issue 
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of bias was improperly before it as it was a matter which should have been commenced via 
judicial review in the High Court and not through the petition before it. The Court therefore, 
did not consider the alleged bias of the commissioners. Despite this, the Court went ahead to 
decide that the President acted constitutionally in removing the DPP. Considering that the 
report of the Tribunal was not before the Court and that the Court never considered the process 
leading to the removal of the DPP, the finding of the Court that the President acted 
constitutionally is problematic as it is not based on any proved facts. In fact, it is a finding not 
based on anything. Such an approach would give credence to suggestions by some stakeholders 
that the whole process of the removal of the DPP was pre-determined. Transparency 
International Zambia Chapter (TIZ), for example, had warned as follows:  
 
What is worrying is that essentially, President Lungu and those that complained against Mutembo Nchito 
have found him guilty of the offences alleged and now the Tribunal’s only task is to determine whether 
he should be removed from office of DPP. This is [an] unfortunate precedent which should not be allowed 
in this country.9 
 
This reasoning of the Constitutional Court on this score is manifestly troubling. How was the 
Court able to determine that the President acted constitutionally in removing the DPP from 
office without delving into the process leading to his removal?  The exercise of constitutional 
power cannot be divorced from the manner by which that power is exercised. Constitutional 
power is given in order to further and not undermine constitutional values and goals. It follows 
that there must be a rational connection between the process and the exercise of constitutional 
power. The two cannot be splintered and dealt with in isolation, as did the Constitutional Court 
in this matter. This is the approach the South African Constitutional Court, for example, has 
taken in many cases. For instance, in the case of Ryan Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence 
and Reconciliation and Others [2010] ZACC 4, the Court asserted that:  
 
courts are obliged to examine the means selected to determine whether they are rationally related to the 
objective sought to be achieved. What must be stressed is that the purpose of the enquiry is to determine 
not whether there are other means that could have been used, but whether the means selected are 
rationally related to the objective sought to be achieved.10  
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The Court took the same approach in the case of Democratic Alliance v President of the 
Republic of South Africa [2012] ZACC 24, when it stated: ‘[i]t also follows that if the failure 
to take into account relevant material is inconsistent with the purpose for which the power was 
conferred, there can be no rational relationship between the means employed and the purpose.’ 
That the Zambian Constitutional Court reached the decision that the President acted 
constitutionally on mere reading of Article 58, without consideration of the process leading to 
the President’s invocation of the power to remove the DPP is shocking. 
 
The third issue that is troubling about the decision of the Court is that the petitioner had sought 
several reliefs from it, including a determination on the issue of bias and conflict of interest by 
two of the members of the Tribunal. The Court of its own motion urged the petitioner to 
consider amending the petition in order to redact some reliefs sought but the petitioner did not 
see the need to do so. In a ruling of 30 May, 2018, the Constitutional Court decided to proceed 
to hear the matter on the basis of the petition as filed. However, at the instance of the Attorney 
General, in a ruling of 18 April, 2019, the Court capitulated and struck off several reliefs that 
the petitioner sought. The effect was that the main issues the petition was mounted around, 
such as compliance with the procedural requirements under which the petitioner was removed 
as well as the bias of the Tribunal members, were no longer under consideration by the Court. 
Only two relatively innocuous claims remained, to do with access to the Tribunal’s report and 
the constitutionality of the exercise of the power of the President in removing the petitioner. In 
doing this, the Court seems to be developing a pattern of either changing the questions it is 
asked by litigants or simply dropping some claims that may be perceived as politically 
sensitive. The same approach was taken, for example, in the case of Daniel Pule and Others v 
Attorney General and Others Selected Judgment No. 60 of 2018 where the Court was asked to 
specifically interpret whether President Lungu would have served two terms of office at the 
end of his current term, but the Court instead replaced the question, and proceeded to answer 
its own question. This approach could open the Court to suspicion that it is deliberately 
avoiding to deal with tough political questions which hinge on constitutional interpretation, the 
result of which may not endear the Court to the executive. 
 
As Professor John Hatchard has argued, such an approach “can be seen as a way of ensuring 
that the most sensitive of political questions are avoided.”11 With their ‘fig leaf’ approach to 
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constitutional interpretation, it is very difficult for the Court to play a more meaningful role at 
critical junctures in the life of the nation (as, for example, did the Malawian judiciary with 
regard to the recent disputed presidential election).  It must be said however, that by running 
away from difficult political questions and defying known rules and best practices of judicial 
practice, the Constitutional Court is undermining its own credibility and legitimacy, and in 
consequence adding fuel to the already increasing public ridicule of its decisions.  
 
In conclusion, we wish to note that the constitutional interpretive approach the Constitutional 
Court has taken does not advance the values of constitutionalism and the rule of law. 
Interpretation is the judge’s primary tool for articulating the law. The interpretive approach a 
court takes can either be used to advance democracy and constitutionalism or it can undermine 
the underlying values of the constitution. It is for this reason that Thomas Jefferson warned: 
“Our peculiar security is possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper 
by construction.”12 A judiciary committed to constitutionalism should interpret the 
Constitution in a manner that promotes the realization of its underlying values, not to 
undermine them. Judging by the Mutembo Nchito judgment, it is hard to see how the 
Constitutional Court’s decision safeguards the integrity of the Constitution and advances the 
rule of law and constitutionalism. Perhaps it was for this reason that Supreme Court Judge, 
Mumba Malila, in a recently published and well-articulated article penned in honour of the late 
Justice Musumali, virulently admonished his colleagues in the Zambian judiciary: “[t]aking a 
leaf from Mr. Justice Musumali’s sterling judicial performance, perchance it is after all not too 
late for adjudicators in Zambia to begin to shake off the entrenched foundations of judicial 
pusillanimity and the resultant self-restraint and lethargy, especially when it comes to 
espousing human rights causes or deciding good governance issues.”13 When will the Zambian 
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